Pretty long book review here, but some HUGE ideas. I think the Heroes and Headlines that are discussed at the end are worth a few minutes of contemplation if your interesting in really thinking about where the world will be 20 years or so down the road.
Blueprint for Action, Thomas Barnett
8/29/07
Finishing this book makes me eager to watch the future unfold and simultaneously makes me wonder why it took me so long to get through the volume. I purchased this book more than a year and a half ago and have been reading it on and off since. If Thomas Friedman is thinking 5-10 years out, Barnett is 10-40 years out and his vision is unmatched by anything I have read. Indeed his blueprint for action clearly leads to a future worth creating.
In his first book, The Pentagon’s New Map, Barnett introduced a lexicon to discuss the current security and globalization situation. There is the Core, the connected states, and the Gap, the areas of the world that is plagued by violence and dictatorship. There are subdivisions, the New Core consisting of China and India, etc. and the Old Core, the U.S., Europe, etc. The seam states are those that are positioned to come one way or the next and allow the Core to access the Gap, i.e. Turkey. Barnett’s offering to establish a system to bring the Gap into the New Core revolves around a Leviathan force in the U.S. Military, able to win wars, and then a System Administration force to win the peace. (Where we lack the numbers in Iraq the Sys Admin coalition would step in)
This book sets out to find a realizable solution, though not immediately executable, clearly his solution is offered as an optimistic alternative to the many doomsayers. He premise is simple, connect the gap and it goes away.
What makes this book so challenging is not that it isn’t written in an easy to understand manner, and it isn’t dry either, it is simply overwhelming. It is hard to think about the reality of how these huge ideas can be applied the world over. So much subtlety yields so much possibility. Simple premises that Barnett injects are so true, yet so hard to comprehend. For example, one of Barnett’s premises is that so many futurists speak doom of the future upon the assumption that humans will not alter than ways or innovate around future problems. He explains that we didn’t leave the Stone Age because we ran out of stones just as we won’t leave the oil age because we ran out of oil; rather, we found a better alternative. The same will be true for oil. Not cause to stop the worry or concern, just a dose of reality.
One of the stunning realities is as the New Core grows; they will dictate rule sets and innovations to the rest of the world. It makes sense. Who needs alternative energy more, the U.S. or China? With China’s growth rate and pollution problems compounded by less per capita discretionary budget results in China needing alternative energy while the U.S. would just like alternative energy. Innovate they will.
As Barnett concludes his blueprint he suggests future heroes we should be looking for and then goes on to suggest one of the greatest ways to see the future is to write the headlines a few years down the road. He takes his own advice.
From the Conclusion (elaborated upon in the text, but headings only provide a summary):
Heroes to Look For:
In Military Affairs:
The four star military police general
Japan’s first combat causality since World War II
Americas first SysAdmin force civilian held captive by the enemy
The “father of Post conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations”
The first SysAdmin soldier to win the Congressional Medal of Honor
The inventor of the Peacemaker (a non lethal weapon with the impact of the Colt 45)
The Sectary of Everything Else (the new Peace Department)
In the National Security Establishment:
The feminist neo-con (spreading feminism throughout the gap)
The reeducation president (education for adults)
The Last Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security)
The first Hispanic major-party nominee for president
The first governor of the fifty-first state of the union
The firs “Chinese daughter” to run for major political office
The Echo Boomers “George Kennan” (Kennan the famous grand strategist, the Echo generation is the result of the baby boomers and as mentioned by Barnett, his key audience (born 1980-1995)
In the politics throughout the Core:
The EU’s: Woodrow Wilson (The Good Cop to the U.S. Bad Cop, keeps balance and builds consensus)
The first Brazilian chair of the G-20 summit
Russia’s Bill Clinton (builds the economy)
The Martin Luther King of Islamic Europe
The “Serpico” who blows the lid of human rights abuses in the global war on terrorism (Serpico investigated NYC police corruption)
The first Russian Secretary General of NATO
The first Old Core company to pay reparation to Gap victims (i.e. Germany after WWII)
In China:
China’s JFK (To the world, ask what China can do for you)
China’s Erin Brockovich (Clean up the pollution)
The first Chinese General Sectary of the North Pacific Treaty Organization
China’s Billy Graham
The first Chinese commander of a joint Sino-American SysAdmin operation
In India:
India’s Margaret Thatcher
India’s Bill Gates
India’s first Oscar-winning Best Picture producer
In the Islamic Middle East
Wired Magazines blogger of the year
The first Arab political leader who leaves office when his legal term ends
The Eminem of Muslim rap
The first Islamic religious leader to win the Nobel Prize
Iran’s John Marshall
Last peacekeeper killed along the Israel-Palestine security fence
The first female leader of an Arab state
In Africa:
The first VJay of MTV Africa
The first African Pope (we’ll there has been three before, but 1500 years ago)
The great African-American political spokesman for African security issues
The first African “Big Man” to surrender power on an ICC plea bargain
The first U.S. military commander of African Command (wait, this has been done since the book printed)
The African Union’s peacekeeping troops win a Nobel Peace Prize
Then, on to the headlines:
2010:
Nixon Goes to Tehran: Grad Bargain in the Works between US and Iran
Doha Round Agreement Hailed as Historic Breakthrough for Struggling Economies
Kim Steps Down After Joint US-China Ultimatum; Korean Reunification Near
Super Flu Overwhelmed Most Nations Medical Systems; Half of Deaths Preventable
Iran-Israel Agreement on Nukes Triggers Tehran’s Recognition of Jewish State
National Security Act Establishes Department of Overseas Contingency Response
Iraqi President Lifts Emergency Decree, Immediately Relinquishes Military Post
China-ASEAN Pact Accelerates Agenda for Asian Free-Trade Area; Japan Korea Next
Synchronized Attacks Drive G-30 to create World Counterterrorism Organization
China’s Demand for Resources Provided Economic Liftoff for Southern Africa
Nuclear Detonation in Northwest Pakistan Described as Terrorist ‘Mistake’
China’s ‘Black Summer’ Triggers Unprecedented Social Unrest; Tipping Point Seen
Putin’s Handpicked Successor Bows to Massive Protest, Accepts Election Defeat
Asia, EU Propel Negotiations for South American Free Trade Zone
Turkey Surprisingly Rapid Entry into EU Signals Europe’s Tilt Toward Arab World
2015
Response to Adana Earthquake Proves Utility of Multination Contingency Force
Taiwan Vote Clears Way for Political ‘Road Map’ Treaty with Mainland China
Russia Begins Formal Membership Talks with EU; Energy Ties Result in ‘Fast Track’
Caspian Coordination Group Finalized Long Term Pipeline Grid Construction Plan
US Led Multination Force Invades Northern Colombia; Bogota in Flames
Kyoto II Accord Goes into Effect When Indian Parliament Approves Pact
Thanks to NATO Effort, AU Peacemaking Force Proves its Mettle in Central Africa
Brasilia Harmonization Talks Yield Draft Treaty for Free Trade Area of the Americas
Korea’s ‘Four Powers’ Served as Embryo for Pacific Rim Treaty Organization
2020
Spread of Religion Across China Alters Policies, Style of Sixth-Generation Leadership
Islamic Opposition Parties Succeed in Loosening EU Restrictions on Immigration
Persian Gulf Security Alliance Cements Role of India and Iran as Regional Pillars
EU Pact with North Africa and Mideast States Completes Goal of Mediterranean Zone
Hispanic Voters Emerge as Key Swing Vote in US National Elections
National Elections Complete Transition of Saudi Monarchy to Constitutional States
Online Game Triggers Dictator’s Departure; Stunning Victory of ‘People’s Diplomacy’
2025
Final Section of Wall Dismantled as Peacekeepers Depart Palestine-Israel Border
Previously String Islamic Terror Network in Africa Now Described as Neutralized
In Historic Shift, Growing Hydrogen Economy Leads to Peaking of Global Oil Demand
Cuba’s ‘Statehood Movement’ Grows Island Vote to Become 53rd State Seems Likely
Lunar Base Global Consortium Plans First Roundtrip of Space Elevator This Year
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Article: Tribes and Soldiers in Baquba
Watch the Sunni Tribes - New York Times
Friedman notes the success the U.S. Army (and perhaps Iraq) has seen in Baquba where foreign fighters had allegedly taken over and the Sinni Tribes banded together and with U.S. Forces to essentially kick the bad actors out. This is new policy and innovative, but Friedman points out the realities. This entire situation of the U.S. partnering with tribes vs. the government could quickly turn. However, it is a chance, and new idea, and it might just work. Time will tell.
In Full:
August 29, 2007
Op-Ed Columnist
Watch the Sunni Tribes
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Baquba, Iraq
When U.S. Army officers try to explain the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, they often talk about the three different time pieces they’re working with: Washington’s is a stop watch, where every second longer we stay in Iraq is a problem; the Iraqi Shiite-led government’s watch often seems broken, and you have to regularly tap it to get it to work; and the Iraqi Sunni watch always wants to go in reverse — back to Saddam’s day, when Sunnis were in charge.
I’ve just bounced between Baquba and Balad and a Sunni and Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad as an embedded reporter with the visiting Adm. William Fallon, head of the Central Command. I don’t know whether the surge is working — too early, too short a visit. But I did see something new here, which, if played right, could help to stabilize Iraq and better synchronize some of those watches.
It’s this: the willingness of the Sunni tribes, and key Sunni neighborhood leaders in Baghdad, to work side by side with the American soldiers they’ve been shooting at for four years in order to retake Sunni towns and districts from the Taliban-like, pro-Al Qaeda Iraqi Sunnis who took charge in 2006, when the undermanned United States forces pulled out of many areas and handed over security to unprepared Iraqi Army units.
Ironically, a key reason violence appears to be trending lower here is because Al Qaeda’s “surge” in 2006 so frightened Iraq’s more moderate, occasionally whisky-drinking Sunni tribal leaders — the backbone of the Sunni community here — that they became willing to work with the Americans just when the U.S. surge was taking off.
Warning! This important shift by the Sunni tribes could come unglued if the Shiite-led Iraqi government doesn’t start providing government services — water, fuel and electricity — to the Sunni areas the tribes have retaken.
It could also come apart because, well, this is Iraq. As one U.S. general said to me of the Sunni tribes, “They still hate us. They just hate Al Qaeda even more right now and they hate the Persians even more than them. But they could turn their guns back on us anytime.”
Baquba, in the heart of Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, is a microcosm of what happened. Last March, as the U.S. military was trying to retake this region from Iraqi jihadists — who had declared it the capital of “The Islamic State of Iraq” and imposed a reign terror, including beheadings for un-Islamic behavior, restrictions on women’s dress and a ban on smoking and alcohol — a U.S. intelligence drone picked up fighting between two Iraqi factions inside the city.
The next day, one of those factions, representing local Sunni tribes, asked a U.S. field officer for help in evicting the Islamic extremists. Thus began a cooperative endeavor that now embraces virtually all 25 Sunni and Shiite tribes in the area, and has the U.S. paying the tribes’ sons to be neighborhood patrols in their own towns and villages. As a result, Baquba’s market, which was sealed shut three months ago, was jammed on Sunday with women shopping for cucumbers, tomatoes and figs at different stalls and men making copies of documents at sidewalk Xerox machines.
Meanwhile, the U.S. forces also brought the official Iraqi Army back into Baquba — only this time with a new division commander — Maj. Gen. Salim Karim Salih, a respected, retired Sunni Army officer, who was one of Saddam’s top generals in the Iran-Iraq war and whose home was nearby. He, too, was ready to work with the Americans to get rid of the pro-Al Qaeda Iraqis.
“The citizens asked me to come back,” he told me. “We need a political solution. But the politics has to be impartial and not just favor one side. And we need action not more words.” That is code for the Shiite-led central government sending money to help repair the town, which it has started to do. “We are in a disaster state now,” added the governor of Diyala Province, Ra’ad al-Tamimi. “We hope the central government will interact with us in a better way.”
I understand the Shiite’s reticence. The Sunnis have resisted everything for four years and now they want government services.
But it is in our interest, because it increases the chances of the only possible solution here, and that is a loose federation in which each sect controls its own areas and Baghdad serves as an oil-funded A.T.M., dispensing cash proportionally.
That is the only way we can get out of here without Iraq exploding. Or, as a Kurdish official said to me: “If you wanted a united Iraq, you never should have gotten rid of Saddam, because he was the only one who could hold this place together.”
Maureen Dowd is off today.
Friedman notes the success the U.S. Army (and perhaps Iraq) has seen in Baquba where foreign fighters had allegedly taken over and the Sinni Tribes banded together and with U.S. Forces to essentially kick the bad actors out. This is new policy and innovative, but Friedman points out the realities. This entire situation of the U.S. partnering with tribes vs. the government could quickly turn. However, it is a chance, and new idea, and it might just work. Time will tell.
In Full:
August 29, 2007
Op-Ed Columnist
Watch the Sunni Tribes
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Baquba, Iraq
When U.S. Army officers try to explain the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, they often talk about the three different time pieces they’re working with: Washington’s is a stop watch, where every second longer we stay in Iraq is a problem; the Iraqi Shiite-led government’s watch often seems broken, and you have to regularly tap it to get it to work; and the Iraqi Sunni watch always wants to go in reverse — back to Saddam’s day, when Sunnis were in charge.
I’ve just bounced between Baquba and Balad and a Sunni and Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad as an embedded reporter with the visiting Adm. William Fallon, head of the Central Command. I don’t know whether the surge is working — too early, too short a visit. But I did see something new here, which, if played right, could help to stabilize Iraq and better synchronize some of those watches.
It’s this: the willingness of the Sunni tribes, and key Sunni neighborhood leaders in Baghdad, to work side by side with the American soldiers they’ve been shooting at for four years in order to retake Sunni towns and districts from the Taliban-like, pro-Al Qaeda Iraqi Sunnis who took charge in 2006, when the undermanned United States forces pulled out of many areas and handed over security to unprepared Iraqi Army units.
Ironically, a key reason violence appears to be trending lower here is because Al Qaeda’s “surge” in 2006 so frightened Iraq’s more moderate, occasionally whisky-drinking Sunni tribal leaders — the backbone of the Sunni community here — that they became willing to work with the Americans just when the U.S. surge was taking off.
Warning! This important shift by the Sunni tribes could come unglued if the Shiite-led Iraqi government doesn’t start providing government services — water, fuel and electricity — to the Sunni areas the tribes have retaken.
It could also come apart because, well, this is Iraq. As one U.S. general said to me of the Sunni tribes, “They still hate us. They just hate Al Qaeda even more right now and they hate the Persians even more than them. But they could turn their guns back on us anytime.”
Baquba, in the heart of Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, is a microcosm of what happened. Last March, as the U.S. military was trying to retake this region from Iraqi jihadists — who had declared it the capital of “The Islamic State of Iraq” and imposed a reign terror, including beheadings for un-Islamic behavior, restrictions on women’s dress and a ban on smoking and alcohol — a U.S. intelligence drone picked up fighting between two Iraqi factions inside the city.
The next day, one of those factions, representing local Sunni tribes, asked a U.S. field officer for help in evicting the Islamic extremists. Thus began a cooperative endeavor that now embraces virtually all 25 Sunni and Shiite tribes in the area, and has the U.S. paying the tribes’ sons to be neighborhood patrols in their own towns and villages. As a result, Baquba’s market, which was sealed shut three months ago, was jammed on Sunday with women shopping for cucumbers, tomatoes and figs at different stalls and men making copies of documents at sidewalk Xerox machines.
Meanwhile, the U.S. forces also brought the official Iraqi Army back into Baquba — only this time with a new division commander — Maj. Gen. Salim Karim Salih, a respected, retired Sunni Army officer, who was one of Saddam’s top generals in the Iran-Iraq war and whose home was nearby. He, too, was ready to work with the Americans to get rid of the pro-Al Qaeda Iraqis.
“The citizens asked me to come back,” he told me. “We need a political solution. But the politics has to be impartial and not just favor one side. And we need action not more words.” That is code for the Shiite-led central government sending money to help repair the town, which it has started to do. “We are in a disaster state now,” added the governor of Diyala Province, Ra’ad al-Tamimi. “We hope the central government will interact with us in a better way.”
I understand the Shiite’s reticence. The Sunnis have resisted everything for four years and now they want government services.
But it is in our interest, because it increases the chances of the only possible solution here, and that is a loose federation in which each sect controls its own areas and Baghdad serves as an oil-funded A.T.M., dispensing cash proportionally.
That is the only way we can get out of here without Iraq exploding. Or, as a Kurdish official said to me: “If you wanted a united Iraq, you never should have gotten rid of Saddam, because he was the only one who could hold this place together.”
Maureen Dowd is off today.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Article: Hitchens Sees Three Wars
We're fighting at least three wars in Iraq. Do you want to end them all? - By Christopher Hitchens - Slate Magazine:
"When people say that they want to end the war in Iraq, I always want to ask them which war they mean. There are currently at least three wars, along with several subconflicts, being fought on Iraqi soil. The first, tragically, is the battle for mastery between Sunni and Shiite. The second is the campaign to isolate and defeat al-Qaida in Mesopotamia. The third is the struggle of Iraq's Kurdish minority to defend and consolidate its regional government in the north. "
Good one by Hitchens and spot on. As the article discusses, the most concerning of the three wars is of course the Shia rule attempting to use the U.S. to purge the Sunnis.
"When people say that they want to end the war in Iraq, I always want to ask them which war they mean. There are currently at least three wars, along with several subconflicts, being fought on Iraqi soil. The first, tragically, is the battle for mastery between Sunni and Shiite. The second is the campaign to isolate and defeat al-Qaida in Mesopotamia. The third is the struggle of Iraq's Kurdish minority to defend and consolidate its regional government in the north. "
Good one by Hitchens and spot on. As the article discusses, the most concerning of the three wars is of course the Shia rule attempting to use the U.S. to purge the Sunnis.
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Atricle: China's Pollution
The New York Times > International > Interactive Feature > Choking on Growth
Great multimedia feature on the NYT site today talking about the cost of China's rapid growth. Indeed, a HUGE problem but at the same time, a problem that is going to be fixed by China. While the world will pressure the country to act on it's self, it will do so of its own volition. As the nation becomes wealthier it will have the ability to act and simply human nature will demand that the nation acts for its self. Little change is more effective than self influenced change.
Great multimedia feature on the NYT site today talking about the cost of China's rapid growth. Indeed, a HUGE problem but at the same time, a problem that is going to be fixed by China. While the world will pressure the country to act on it's self, it will do so of its own volition. As the nation becomes wealthier it will have the ability to act and simply human nature will demand that the nation acts for its self. Little change is more effective than self influenced change.
Book: Success Stories
Success Stories, Robert Kiyosaki
8/26/07
Kiyosaki puts together a collection of 22 stories of people that have followed his Rich Dad principals and achieved financial success. Backgrounds range in age, walk of life, social class, etc., but all decided to focus in learning real estate or business investment or both. Indeed, the stories are motivational. Principals that are continually reinforced are being ok with failure, and through due diligence.
A story I noted was Michelle LaBrosse who had program management experience and desired to get her PMP (Program Management Professional) Certification and in the process wrote a course that she sold to others. Her business grew to the largest PMP training program in the industry.
The book is worth reading for motivation and to spur further study of topics found interesting.
8/26/07
Kiyosaki puts together a collection of 22 stories of people that have followed his Rich Dad principals and achieved financial success. Backgrounds range in age, walk of life, social class, etc., but all decided to focus in learning real estate or business investment or both. Indeed, the stories are motivational. Principals that are continually reinforced are being ok with failure, and through due diligence.
A story I noted was Michelle LaBrosse who had program management experience and desired to get her PMP (Program Management Professional) Certification and in the process wrote a course that she sold to others. Her business grew to the largest PMP training program in the industry.
The book is worth reading for motivation and to spur further study of topics found interesting.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Article: 4 Soldiers' Take on Iraq
The War as We Saw It - New York Times
Wow, you want a short essay on what is going on in Iraq right now and the realities that the US must face as we proceed read this. Written by a collection of soldiers from the 82d Airborne and in my opinion couldn't have been better captured by anyone. An impressive take.
August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias. Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run. At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Wow, you want a short essay on what is going on in Iraq right now and the realities that the US must face as we proceed read this. Written by a collection of soldiers from the 82d Airborne and in my opinion couldn't have been better captured by anyone. An impressive take.
August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias. Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run. At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Travel: Paddling in Maine
Paddling Down Maine From Inn to Inn - New York Times
Grab a boat and paddle along the coast avoiding the cheap commerce on either end of the towns for scenic coast line. Seems like a nice way to go. I've driven this, might be nice to paddle it. The restaurants sound good enough to make it all worth while.
Grab a boat and paddle along the coast avoiding the cheap commerce on either end of the towns for scenic coast line. Seems like a nice way to go. I've driven this, might be nice to paddle it. The restaurants sound good enough to make it all worth while.
Thursday, August 23, 2007
Book: Wall Street Meat
Wall Street Meat, Andy Kessler
8/23/07
The book autobiographically takes the reader from Kessler’s leaving Bell Labs and beginning as an analyst for Paine Webber and then on to Morgan Stanley. It can almost be called an expose of the investment banking industry as technology entered the market. It is a quick and easy read that, like all of the Kessler work I have read, has many lessons to teach. The concept that everyone on Wall Street is meat is pretty founded. Wall Street provides the world access to capital and can never be replaced. The worlds smartest are there constantly looking for the next way to make a buck. If you want a glimpse of what Wall Street was like up until the internet bubble popped this tells the story fairly well.
Interesting to read this as the “credit bubble” is in the middle of popping, yet again, I’m sure Wall Street will reinvent its self. Another thing I noted was how, like anywhere, personal networks provide access to everything, from information to boxing tickets.
8/23/07
The book autobiographically takes the reader from Kessler’s leaving Bell Labs and beginning as an analyst for Paine Webber and then on to Morgan Stanley. It can almost be called an expose of the investment banking industry as technology entered the market. It is a quick and easy read that, like all of the Kessler work I have read, has many lessons to teach. The concept that everyone on Wall Street is meat is pretty founded. Wall Street provides the world access to capital and can never be replaced. The worlds smartest are there constantly looking for the next way to make a buck. If you want a glimpse of what Wall Street was like up until the internet bubble popped this tells the story fairly well.
Interesting to read this as the “credit bubble” is in the middle of popping, yet again, I’m sure Wall Street will reinvent its self. Another thing I noted was how, like anywhere, personal networks provide access to everything, from information to boxing tickets.
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Blog: Credit Markets
I don’t pretend to be an economist, but the current effect the credit markets are having on the economy is simply fascinating. As always, the market seldom behaves as expected. The idea that so much debt was leveraged in such a seemingly safe way is tremendous. This is what I have gathered:
Debt was cheap and improperly assessed as high grade. That is, loans that might default were viewed as loans that wouldn’t default. Much of that was based on the assumption that housing prices would rise. Regular folks were getting interest only loans and other mortgages that allowed them to buy more house than they would have been able to with conventional instruments such as a 30 year fixed rate loan. Many people were doing that and the real estate market was able to increase prices faster than a more conventional credit market would have allowed. The result is inflated housing prices. Now, I don’t think we have really heard how much this permeates the commercial real estate market, but certainly we’ll see in the coming months.
Simultaneously, hedge funds have been leveraging (borrowing money for) huge positions as to make small profits, but many times over, on seemingly sure thing, historically validated, trades. As the ability to borrow money (form the credit markets, again) decreased because of sub-prime concerns positions had to be covered to prevent further losses. Hence the market plunges.
Now central banks step in and dump money into the economy. From my “globalist view” that is great because it make money cheaper for growing economies, but as any pundit will tell you, that devalues everything to create liquidity. Fundamentally, more money in the system facilitates economic growth at the possible risk of inflation. (I had to brush up my economics and did it here) Of course, increasing the money supply doesn’t have any effect on the rate of delinquency of those maybe not so sure not to default mortgages.
So what I would imagine comes next: Clearly housing prices have to correct. Some people that need to refinance adjustable rate mortgages are going to have to do so with their home’s value appraised at less than they paid for it and they will be unable to get new adjustable rate or interest only mortgages. People might have to see their homes (at a loss) or risk defaulting on their mortgage. Perhaps the same will occur in commercial real estate. Simultaneously, the “new reality” in the credit markets will make hedge funds less able to borrow money to buy companies which will inject less money into the stock market. I think the economy is strong, but at the same time, the possibility of a recession certainly seems reasonable, it just seems like there will be less money to invest in businesses and therefore grow the economy.
The most conservative (credit doomsayer) blog I read is MarketTicker. I think a lot of his predictions are valid and if you’re interested in this sort of stuff it seems like very informed analysis.
Saturday, August 11, 2007
Book: 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
7 Habits of Highly Effective People, Stephen Covey
8/10/07
8/10/07
7 Habits is a tremendous life changing book that spells out the common
sense of living well and being happy. The idea is that habits based on
principals fit everywhere and drive to the core of what we would all
aspire to be. Simply summarized as "Make and keep promises and involve
others in a problem and work together to solve it.
As all the habits are applied the concept of Production vs. Production
Capacity is kept in mind. The balance between producing and improving
the machine that produces is key. This can be applied you one's self, a
business, a relationship, etc. So learn, develop (PC), and do (P).
The book, and habits really, are divided into two parts: 1-3 is
developing independence and creating a private victory (with ones self)
and 4-6 are about reaching interdependence and creating a public victory
(with a team). The last habit is about renewal.
First, one must define who they are. Habit 1 is to Be Proactive, decide
what you want to be and take action. Once you have created that, Habit
2 is to Begin with the End in Mind. That is, make the plan, write a
personal mission statement. This is the leadership step, how do achieve
what is really important, what does the end look like? Once you have
that, you're ready for Habit 3, Put First Things First. It is the idea
of prioritizing your day to day life. The management step. Developing
relationships is important, but not urgent and it is often neglected.
Naturally, there should be focus here instead of interruptions that are
"urgent." These first three steps liberate you from being dependent on
other people and value yourself and your time.
Once a platform of independence is established the quest for
interdependence begins. These habits rely on developing productive
relationships with everyone: in business, at home, etc. Habit 4 is
Think Win/Win. How can a solution be found that everyone feels good
about? You don't want to get walked on, but if everyone can win
relationships are strengthened and production increases. A caveat to
this is Win/Win or No Deal. In some situations, if a Win/Win solution
cannot be found, it might be best for both parties to walk away. Part
of getting to a Win/Win solution is Habit 5, Seek First to Understand,
then be Understood. To truly listen to someone and understand their
point of view is essential to effective relationships. To stop and
listen and understand is obviously very hard especially when people
think they are right or are passionate. Once Habit 5 is achieved, the
relationship is prepared for Habit 6, Synergize. Synergy is defined as
the whole being greater than its parts. 1+1=3. Once both parties
understand one and other and the foundations of the situation and
appreciated by all the group can come together to find new ideas and
growth that would have been otherwise unobtainable.
Habit 7 is to Sharpen the Saw. Taking time to develop once physical,
mental, spiritual, and Social/Emotional dimensions. Through this, the
study of the habits begins anew.
Following and implementing these habits is no small task, but striving
to do so is rewarding everyday. From developing a mission statement to
writing down goals to define one's self reveals endless possibilities.
Then, to have synergistic interaction may be, quite simply, the point.
Book: OPM
OPM: Other Peoples Money, Michael Lechter
8/11/07
8/11/07
OPM is a book about finding money to fund a venture. Instead of finding
a great business deal and saying "I can't afford it" you learn here that
you just have to find the right stream of capital. Funding sources are
many, but the book begins by reviewing why one would need funding and
typical ways businesses go about getting it. For starters, simple
stories that show how a business' present and future value is calculated
are told. That is followed by brief explanations of business plans and
financial statements that would be prepared to get funding. The major
sources of funding for both small to medium business are discussed and
include: Friends and Family (Seed Money), Angel Investors ($500k-$1M),
Venture capital ($1M-$50M), Banks, Joint Ventures, Strategic
Partnerships, and Licensing.
Throughout the book securities laws are reinforced and the importance of
having a good lawyer ensures that all are in compliance with them. The
book provides a great 300 page overview to a subject that could fill
many volumes. As part of the Rich Dad series it is simply a taste of
what is out there and as one becomes more interested in a specific
source of funding more reading and research would be required. This
makes sense as it would be unlikely that someone would be seeking Angle
and VC funding at the same time.
Workouts
6/9/07
6 times
2 min run
2 min rest
6 times
2 min run
2 min rest
6/10/07
30 min run
5 rounds, max reps, BW Bench Press
4 rounds, max reps, strict pullups
3 rounds, 12 reps, squat machine
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Article: 6 Stocks
6 Trends to Bank On
From Fortune Magazine, Aug 07
By Tom Gardner, Motley Fool
From Fortune Magazine, Aug 07
By Tom Gardner, Motley Fool
6 Trends and stocks to go with them:
1 - Digital Gadgets are here to stay (Dolby Labs, DLB)
2 - We're going to need oil for awhile (Unit Corp, UNT)
3 - Everyone is eating out all the time; buy the oven maker (Middleby
Corp, MIDD)
4 - In the south, they are still building homes (MDC Holdings, MDC)
5 - Medical Records are going to go electronic (Quality Systems, QSII)
6 - Adventure Sports are here to stay too (Volcom, VLCM)
All these are long holds, at least five years. Really, I should say
short holds at five years.
Tuesday, August 7, 2007
Article: Hang Your Hammock Here
From Aug 07 Men’s Health Best Life
Five up and coming alternatives to overpriced real estate hot spots:
Turkish Rivera over
Romanian Alps over the Italian
The logic is simple, the other places have been done and the others are up and coming, if even that. You have got to have some long term thinking to make the profit here.
Sunday, August 5, 2007
Book: Atlas Shrugged
Atlas Shrugged, Ayn Rand
8/4/07
Who is John Galt? To understand you’ll have to read the book, but in essence, he is the voice of capitalism. Ayn Rand uses a good story to illustrate the woes of government regulation that taxes capitalistic endeavors. It is about rules that strip the competitive marketplace of its competition and kill the marketplace and the economy. The story tells how this might happen. One must take into account that the book was written in the 1950’s and the results of the themes, Objectivism, as it is called, looks a lot like what globalization looks like today.
What I enjoyed the most was the spirit of the characters. The industrialists were driven by nothing but desire to succeed. Never mind the financial reward; though they slowly learned how it could be enjoyed, rather, the best reward was the running of a successful enterprise.
Additionally, the book teaches that the best industrialists, or business persons, have unquestionable character and that is impressive. The concept is that every deal is a trade where both people can win. Get rid of the tricks and you have a better marketplace. The tricks are that of the looters, attempting to cheat and get ahead.
“Nobody stays here by faking reality in any manner whatever” – Ayn Rand
“I swear by my life and my love of it that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine” – Ayn Rand
Article: The Credit Market
NYT, 8/5/07
Following the spin of the credit market has been fascinating for me. As this article points out, a correction of the type of credit that is being “corrected” right now hasn’t been seen before. What fascinates me is all the implications. Like, credit squeeze. I would argue that money had flowed into the stock market, less money was available for the credit market, housing prices and interest rates rise, refinancing needs to happen because of 3/1 ARM’s and the like (don’t we all wish we went for the 30 year fixed right now?), but inflation stays in check. The results are this, as the article says, lack of available money to finance things. Wow. So how do you play it?
Thursday, August 2, 2007
Article: Head, Sholder, Foot
From a startup blog, this short one talks about the types of people to build a business around, in reality, I think you can build you’re life around this concept, you need them all as part of your personal network. Business, life, anything really, simple concept, find the people that play these parts. Posted in full below.
Head, shoulder, foot!
from Found & Read
Founders often overlook 3 key emotional components when building their teams.
By mike simonsen, August 01, 2007 — 0 Comments
Most founders think about complementing technical or business skills when they build their intial team. Fewer think about the emotional components required to marshal the operation to success. When we started Altos Research, a great entrepreneur (my Mom, as it turns out) gave me the following advice about the emotional side of building a business: Every entrepreneur needs a head, a shoulder, and a foot. (If these don’t sound like “emotional” componenets, hear me out.)
The Head is the person who gives you your strategic guidance.
The independent voice with whom you discuss the business, the options, and the best tactics for reaching your goals. I have a group of advisers that I turn to regularly: VC friends who are not investors in my company are particularly valuable. Other successful entrepreneurs provide unbiased insight – “Don’t budget for better than 5:1 sales comp ratio, Mike.” Your Head needs to be a person who just gets it. Someone who helps you think bigger and better. Someone who you don’t have to educate or sell. Someone who wants you to succeed.
The Shoulder is the person you lean on when times are tough.
Every founder lives through the down-cycles and self-doubt. Your Shoulder says, “You’ll pull through it. Your product is so amazing!” Most of the time your Shoulder can’t be an employee or investor. Employees and investors need to see you as indefatigable. Your spouse may not be your Shoulder either. My wife does not want to hear that I’m worried about making the mortgage payment. The Shoulder is a rare kind of advisor, usually someone very close, even family, but with little actually at stake in your business. The Shoulder simply knows you can’t fail.
The Foot is the one who kicks you in the ass when you need it.
For me this is the role my wife takes. She is the one I can’t let down. When we started the company, she set a deadline for our firm to have revenue – or I’d have to go get a job. We made that deadline, and now it’s part of our routine to keep her appraised of the sales growth. She lets me know if my targets are too low. The Foot is often the best role for your VCs, if you have a good relationship with them: “You showed me your plan, go make your numbers!” (But, if you have a lousy or confrontational relationship with your VCs, then the investor-driven-numbers game can devolve into meaningless bs, so watch out.) At Altos Research, we have no outside investors, so my wife is the non-employee with the most at stake. She is the Foot, the person who won’t let me slow down long enough to fail.
The trick is to know the people around you who are best for each role. Maybe that’s why having multiple founders can be advantageous. My co-founder is an excellent Head for me. We can make sweeping strategic decisions in minutes. I have to go outside the company for the other body parts.
Just don’t expect your Shoulder to contribute to big strategy decisions.
Don’t expect sympathy from your Foot.
Intervals and Weights
8 times:
45 sec sprint
1 min rest
Men’s Health Chest Workout (3 super sets of 3 rounds of 2 exer)
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