This article highlights seven things that I think most western folks working in Iraq, working about Iraq, or even talking about Iraq don't know, haven't considered, or forgotten. Bottomline, westerners have different values than Middle Easterners, and maybe that is ok.
The Pillars pasted from the article:
1—Iraqi society is based upon a strict patriarchal hierarchy
under which a sheikh has absolute power over his
tribe. The concept of civil government centralized at the
provincial and national level is still relatively new (only a
few decades old) to the Iraqis, whose social structure remains
tribal. As such, the Western concept of democracy and the value of
sharing power is an alien concept within their society. It is only
important to Iraqi officials while the U.S. officials coordinating
reconstruction efforts are in the room dispensing benefits.
2—The primary concern of Iraqi officials is not democracy
or the political evolution of a successful Iraqi nationstate.
It is the use of their position in government to gain
personal wealth, as well as benefits for their extended family,
tribe or sect. This observation is not a character attack,
but merely reflects the reality that in a Bedouin society,
where the foundational social unit is the tribe, one’s primary
loyalty and goals run to that tribe. Saddam’s government
was packed with his family and tribal members because
they were loyal and because it was expected of him,
within the culture, to bring benefits to his tribe by virtue of
his prominence. Other Iraqi officials are no different in this
regard; it is their cultural norm for the political leader to
work in his self-interest and for that of his tribe.
3—If Iraqis do not value something, they will not fight
for it. This is one reason why the Iraqi army made such
poor showings in the Gulf War and in Operation Iraqi
Freedom-1 (OIF-1). They melted away because they
were being asked to fight for something in which they did not
believe. Yet these same Iraqis are tenaciously fighting the
world’s predominant military power tooth and nail in
their tribal areas and in their cities. What’s the difference?
The insurgents are now fighting for something they believe
in—expelling foreign troops and sectarian enemies from the tribal
areas and cities that they hold dear.
4—In a society that is evolving from a difficult Bedouin
desert existence, where water and other base staples of life
have historically been in short supply, the Iraqis have
learned that the group that controls the resources of the
province or nation lives; he who does not dies. Sharing
of resources or power with competing groups outside one’s
own tribe is an unfamiliar and foreign concept.
5—Individually, Iraqis are a warm and generous people.
As the size of their group grows, however, whether as
a family unit, tribe or an entire sect, their generosity to
those not within their social circle wanes. The historic
sense that one only takes care of his own—borne of their
harsh desert life—minimizes their collective willingness to
compromise or share resources or power. The lessons they
have learned through centuries of desert survival is that
only the strong get the resources and survive. As such,
armed struggle for power, not compromise and democratic-
style debate, is the norm.
6—Trading and bartering for personal or tribal gain is
part of the Iraqi/Bedouin culture. Self-sacrifice for the general
welfare is not. Accordingly, our frustration with “Why
don’t the Iraqis just try to get along for their mutual benefit?”
is a Western, culturally based value judgment being
applied to an Oriental society for whom violent conflict to
gain advantage is the norm. If the current Sunni insurgency
is to be stopped, therefore, we must demonstrate to
the Iraqi insurgents that the personal benefits of a peace
with the Shiites clearly outweighs the possible gain by
continuing to fight for dominance. Increased U.S. military operations
will inflame this struggle for political dominance,
not diminish it.
7—Iraqis do not share Western concepts on the use, passage
or value of time. They sincerely believe that if a matter
is truly important, Allah will control the outcome, and the
personal efforts of individuals are merely tangential to that
outcome. This is a source of frustration for U.S. servicemembers
who have served in Iraq and seen an apparent lack of
resolve, follow-through or reliability from his Iraqi counterpart.
The concept of inshallah—”God willing” or “only if God wills it, will it
happen”—overshadows all aspects of Iraqi life, including reconstruction
and political evolution. As such, the political resolution, if any, in
Iraq will be achieved according to the glacial pace of Iraqi society,
not based on a U.S. timetable. It is critical to recognize this concept if
we wish to set realistic timetables for the continued presence and
relevance of U.S. troops in Iraq.
